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God's Simple, Consequent and Antecedent Will

God wills that all men be saved and yet not all are saved; this seems to imply that God's will is not always fulfilled (ST I 19.6 obj 1). Thomas responds that God's *simple* will is always met even if God's *antecedent* will is not. God may will that no one sins, but yet it is in our power to sin and we frequently do, God's will is consequently satisfied by God's justice when we are punished. Damascene states that God has a consequent and an antecedent will and the salvation of all is God's antecedent will while the reprobation of some is the satisfaction of God's consequent will (ST I 19.6 ro 1). Aquinas qualifies this by saying, "This distinction must not be taken as applying to the divine will itself, in which there is nothing antecedent or consequent, but to the things willed." (Ibid.) God's will *per se* is simple. However God does will things antecedently and consequently. The antecedent will that all men be saved may not be met and the consequent will that justice be satisfied then comes into play. Willing in a consequent way takes into considerations all the conditions and qualifications of the situation since the will is always directed towards things as they are, not simply. While we only ever will non-simply, God can will simply. (I'm pondering whether with beatific vision we could simply will the will of God by allowing our wills to be perfectly conformed to God's. But this line of thinking is not important to the question at hand.)

It seems to me that what is willed consequentially (usually) becomes the antecedent for a later consequent willing and since God's antecedent will may not be fulfilled, the concept of simply willing is vacuous. For example, if (antecedently) God wills that all men be saved but a man turns from the will of God inasmuch as in their ability, then (consequently) God wills that justice be served through punishment. If (antecedently) the punishment restores the man to justice, then (consequently) the man will be saved—setting aside Anselm's worry about unsatisfiable infinite debts for the moment. If (antecedently) however, the punishment fails to restore the man to justice, then (consequently) the man will not be saved. If Aquinas' argument is that in the end God's will must be satisfied and God wills that all be saved (assuming this is part of God's simple will and not an antecedent will) then Thomas is proposing universalism—which he later rejects. However, if the will that all be saved is antecedent, then why does the Apostle bother to reveal it?

I find this distinction to run the same course as Whitehead's conception of God having both a primordial, unchanging nature and a relationally defined consequent nature. Clearly Thomas is not a process theologian, but the same criticisms leveled against Whitehead's notion of God's consequent nature apply to the idea of fallible antecedent and relative consequent wills.